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Introduction.  
In many countries, including Canada, it is a criminal offence to transmit or expose 
others to the risk of infection with HIV through unprotected sex.1 There is currently no 
specific section in Canada’s Criminal Code making it a crime to knowingly transmit, 
attempt to transmit, or expose others to the risk of infection with HIV/AIDS. However, in 
September 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada released its judgment in R. v. Cuerrier2 
which dealt with the criminal prosecution of an HIV-positive person for engaging in 
sexual activity without disclosing his/her seropositive status. Overruling lower-courts 
decisions, the Supreme Court stated that where sexual activity poses a “significant risk of 
serious bodily harm”, there is a duty on the HIV-positive person to disclose his or her 
HIV-status.3  
 
Where the duty to disclose the HIV status exists, the failure to disclose constitutes 
“fraud” that renders a sexual partner’s consent to that activity legally invalid, thereby 
transforming consensual sex into an “assault” under Canadian criminal law.4 Under sec. 
265(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, a person commits an assault when, “without the consent 
of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person.”5  In Cuerrier, the 
Supreme Court held that this requirement of establishing that “he intentionally applied 
force” is satisfied if the HIV-positive person committed the act of consensual unprotected 
intercourse. With regard to consent, the Supreme Court asserted that non-disclosure of 
one’s serostatus may constitute fraud.  
 
To determine whether the absence of disclosure of one’s HIV status actually 
constitutes fraud, the Supreme Court in Cuerrier developed a new test. First, the actions 
of the person living with HIV/Aids must be assessed objectively to determine whether a 
reasonable person would find them to be “dishonest”. 6 In Cuerrier, the Court held that 
there is no difference “between lies and a deliberate failure to disclose”.7 Therefore, the 
non-disclosure of an important fact, such as HIV infection, can be considered 
“dishonest”.8 Second, the Crown must prove that the dishonest act had the effect of 
exposing the person consenting to a “significant risk of serious bodily harm”.9 The Court 
established that the risk of contracting HIV meets that test, since unprotected sexual 
                                                 
1 In Canada, the courts do not make the difference between exposing someone to HIV/AIDS and actual 
transmission of the disease.  
2 R. v. Cuerrier [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 [Cuerrier]. 
3 Ibid, at par. 14.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Criminal Code. R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 718; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 155; 1995, c. 22, s. 6. S. 265 
[Criminal Code]. 
6 Currier, supra note 2 at 116-118. 
7 Ibid at 126.  
8 Ibid, at 14, 128. 
9 Ibid. 
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intercourse presents a “significant risk” of infection with HIV, a virus causing “serious 
bodily harm”.10 Third, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person 
would not have consented to sex, if the person living with HIV would have disclosed 
his/her status.11 In summary, consent to sexual intercourse may be vitiated by fraud under 
s. 265 of the Criminal Code if the failure to disclose the HIVpositive status is dishonest 
and results in deprivation by putting the partner at a significant risk of suffering serious 
bodily harm.12 
 
Since Cuerrier, there have been increasing numbers of prosecutions and 
convictions of HIV-positive persons for engaging in unprotected sexual behaviour 
without disclosing their HIV status. In the context of HIV criminal cases, judges 
formulate and apply criminal law rules on the assumption that they will influence conduct 
and thus affect deterrence.  In fact, a close analysis of HIV criminal law cases shows that 
the deterrence rationale is used in every HIV case to justify the imposition of criminal 
responsibility.  
 
Deterrence is defined as a means of crime control aimed at preventing criminal 
behaviour by fear of punishment. The deterrence theory is to affect behaviour by 
dissuading the offender from committing crimes in the future, or discouraging other 
potential criminals from committing the same crime on the basis of the perception that 
they may be caught and punished.13 Deterrence may be “specific” or “general”.14 
“Specific deterrence” is aimed at regulating only the conduct of the offender who is 
sentenced. “General deterrence” is aimed at regulating the conduct of potential offenders 
other than the individual sentenced.  This approach is used to dissuade the general public 
from engaging in high-risk behaviour by instilling fear of punishment.  This latter type of 
deterrence is the one currently promoted by courts in cases of criminalization of 
transmission and exposure of HIV/Aids.  
 
In the context of HIV criminal law, supporters of the deterrence doctrine assume 
that an HIV-positive person contemplating consensual unprotected sex without disclosing 
his/her HIV status will be deterred because of the certainty that he/she will be caught and 
punished. In other words, the criminal penalty is supposed to have a negative inducement 
which will discourage people from engaging in behaviour that violates the law. Courts 
have stated that, rather than punishing after the fact, deterring harmful conduct in the 
future is, and should be, the primary function of criminal sanctions.15 The focus on 
deterrence in encouraging precautionary conduct through criminalization is motivated by 
                                                 
10 Ibid, at 19. 
11 Ibid, at 130. 
12 Ibid.  
13 H (1980), 3 A. Crime. R. 53, at p. 74.  
14 Criminal Code, supra note 5, sec. 718,  
15 See infra note  criminal HIV cases.  
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public health concerns and reduction of overall HIV transmissions.16 However, the 
criminalization of HIV/AIDS transmission and exposure may not ultimately serve to 
prevent further transmissions. 
 
First, this research paper will analyze the role of the concept of deterrence in the 
justification for the criminalization of HIV/AIDS.  Then, it will argue that scholars and 
lawmakers are not warranted in using deterrence arguments in new areas of law like the 
criminalization of HIV/AIDS where the efficacy of legal rules in deterring harmful 
conduct has never been demonstrated. To this end, the paper will explore three distinct 
aspects. Section A will analyze the rationale underlying the criminalization of HIV and 
show that charges and prosecutions of HIV-positive people are more frequent and that 
their sentences are especially long. Section B will examine the deterrence argument as a 
principle of sentencing in general and in the context of the criminalization of HIV/AIDS. 
Section C will examine the social science literature and judicial critique prompting and 
support our skepticism as to whether the criminal law deters.  
 
Second, this research paper will argue that in addition to not meeting the objective 
of preventing HIV/AIDS transmissions, the imposition of criminal penalties intended to 
deter may even have negative impact on control of HIV transmissions. In fact, 
criminalization of non-disclosure of seropositivity, may amongst other effects, discourage 
people from getting tested, impede education, undermine counseling efforts to reduce the 
risk of transmission and stigmatize people living with HIV/AIDS, a group already 
socially, culturally and/or economically marginalized.  
 
A. The Criminalization of Sexual HIV/AIDS Transmission and Exposure in 
Canada 
There are a number of cases in which HIV-positive individuals have been 
prosecuted under criminal law for engaging in sexual behaviour without disclosing their 
HIV status. Canada, as well as many other countries17, has decided to criminalize the 
failure to disclose one’s HIV-status, motivated by the deterrence rationale.18  This section 
                                                 
16 See e.g. Winifred H. Holland. « HIV/AIDS and the criminal law » (1994) Crim L. Q. 279, 288 [Holland]; 
Stephan Kenney. “Criminalizing HIV transmission : lessons from History and a Modal for the Future”, 
(1992) 8 J Contemp. Health L. & Policy 245 [Kenney]; Donald H. J. Hermann. “Criminalizing Conduct 
Related to HIV Transmission” (1990) 9 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 352 [Hermann]. 
17 It is a crime to expose another person to the risks of HIV transmission, whether or not the transmission 
has occurred in the following countries: New South Wales, China, Vietnam, Denmark, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine South Africa, East Timor, Kenya. According to 
Lazzarini & al. infra note 21, from 1980 to 2001 27 seven states enacted criminal HIV exposure or 
transmission statutes. In the U.S. Penalties for exposure without disclosure (and without malice) range from 
a short prison sentence or a fine of $2500, or both, in Virginia, to a maximum of 30 years in prison in 
Arkansas. 
18 See e.g. Holland supra note 16; Kenney supra note 16. 
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explains the rationales for the criminalization of HIV/AIDS and describes the history and 
recent evolution of prosecution of people living with HIV/AIDS.  
 
1. Rationales for the Criminalization of HIV transmissions and 
exposures 
Advocates of the criminalization of HIV/AIDS argue that criminal law will deter 
HIV-positive individuals from risk taking behavior, as well as punish individuals who 
place others at risk of infection.19 They assume that criminal punishment will help to 
deter individuals from engaging in future conduct behaviours carrying the risks of HIV 
transmissions: “Criminal statutes are effective to deter individuals from engaging in HIV 
transmitting behaviour […] There is a social objective to prevent conduct likely to spread 
HIV in order to prevent further transmission of HIV to uninfected persons […].”20 In 
other words, criminal law attempts to deter transmission or exposure by punishing those 
responsible, with the belief that the threat of incarceration will operate as deterrent for the 
general population.21 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada alleges that fear of criminal 
punishment can deter sero-positive people to engage in risky sexual conduct without 
disclosing their HIV status. Using inflammatory language, Chief Justice Cory states that 
the criminal law “provides a needed measure of protection in the form of deterrence and 
reflects society’s abhorrence of the self-centred recklessness and the callous insensitivity 
of the actions of the respondent and those who have acted in a similar manner.”22   
Next section will examine whether the deterrence criminal theory, which is the 
sole argument supporting criminalization, is valid.  
 
2. History of Criminal Prosecution 
In fact, history demonstrates the submission that the criminal law is not a suitable 
vehicle for proscribing and limiting human sexual behaviour. Criminal sanctions are 
ineffective in limiting risky consensual sexual behaviour. For example, laws relating to 
prostitution, transmission of syphilis, and sodomy have been unsuccessful to prevent 
those behaviours.23  
 
In 1985, a section of the Criminal Code, which made it an offence to knowingly 
transmit a venereal disease or sexually transmitted infection (STI), was repealed by the 
Canadian government24,  on the ground that the proscribed behaviour was a public health 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hermann, supra note 16 at 352-353.  
21 Zita Lazzarini & Robert Klitzman « HIV and the Law : Integrating Law, Policy, and Social 
Epidemiology » (2002) 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics, at p. 537 [Lanzzarini 2002].  
22 Cuerrier, supra note 2 at 142.  
23 D. McGinnis. “Law and Leprosis of Lust: regulating syphilis and AIDS”. (1990) 20 49 Ottawa Law Rev, 
at 57 [McGinnis]. 
24 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1985, S.C. 1985, c. 19, s.42 [Criminal Law Amendment Act]. 
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issue rather than a criminal law issue.25 Furthermore, the government concluded that the 
offense of knowingly transmitting an STI was counterproductive. The government stated 
that criminalizing the transmission of an STI made it difficult to obtain accurate reports 
on the disease, since people at risk were inhibited to get tested as they were afraid to be 
criminally charged if tested positive.26 This paper approves the government’s decision to 
repeal this specific mentioned and agrees that criminalizing STI transmission is 
counterproductive.  
 
As opposed to this stand taken by the Canadian government in relation to STI 
transmission, HIV/AIDS transmission and exposure has been criminalized in Canadian 
law. Even if there is still no specific section in the Criminal Code making it a crime to 
knowingly transmit, attempt to transmit, or expose others to the risk of infection with 
HIV, non-disclosure is now subject to criminal charges. Over the last 18 years, a number 
of cases have indeed been reported in which people living with HIV have been criminally 
charged for a variety of acts that result in HIV transmission or carry the risk of 
transmission. Criminal prosecutions in HIV non-disclosure cases have been based on 
common nuisance27, assault28, aggravated assault29, sexual assault30, aggravated sexual 
assault31, criminal negligence32 and first-degree murder.33 
An overview since 1989 demonstrates that out of the 65 charges laid, most of the 
people charged are Caucasian heterosexual males. However, 21 people charged are non-
                                                 
25 McGinnis, supra note 23. See also Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution. Pornography 
and prostitution in Canada. (1985) (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre), 1985 [Canadian 
report]. 
26 Criminal Law Amendment Act, supra note 24. Interestingly, McGinnis supra note 23, made an allusion 
that this section might have been revoked because the criminal liability may deter people from seeking 
counsel or treatment. See also Canadian Report, supra note 25. 
27 Criminal Code, ibid, at sec. 180. A person who does an unlawful act, or fails to discharge a legal duty, 
thereby endangering the lives, safety, or health of the public, or causing physical injury to any person, 
commits a “common nuisance”. This offense carries a maximum penalty of two years in prison.  
28 Ibid, at sec. 265. It is an assault to « apply force intentionally » to another person without their consent. 
There is no legally valid consent where a person consents by reasons of “fraud”. The offense of assault 
carries a penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment.  
29 Ibid, at sec. 268. Where the offender endangers the life of the complainant, the penalty carries a 
maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment.  
30 Ibid, at sec. 271. In the context of the criminalization of HIV, the offense of sexual assault is applied 
even if the intercourse is consensual.  This offense carries a penalty of a maximum of ten years.  
31 Ibid, at sec. 273. A person is liable of aggravated assault if the assault is of sexual nature and endangers 
the life of the complainant. The maximum sentence of aggravated assault is life imprisonment.  
32 Ibid, at sec, 219 and 221. A person is « criminally negligent » if, in doing anything or omitting to do 
anything that « shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons” Criminal 
negligence offense carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment.  
33 Ibid, at sec. 229, 230. First degree murder carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. A person is 
guilty of first degree murder if they do something with the intent of causing bodily harm or with the intent 
of causing bodily harm. In HIV criminal cases, first degree murder are applied when a HIV-positive person 
shows reckless disregard as to whether death ensues from consensual sex or not.  
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Caucasians (see Table 1)34 and most of those charges were made in the last 7 years (see 
Table 2).  
 
Table 1 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE CHARGED 
Men TOTAL: 59 
• Caucasians:  45* if the race is not specified, assumptions that 
man is Caucasian.  
• Black men: 12 
• Latinos: 2 
Women TOTAL: 06  
• Native: 2  
• Asian: 1 
TOTAL 65 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
CHARGES LAID 
LEGEND:  
• MEN: I 
• BLACK MEN: B 
• LATINO MEN: L 
• WOMEN: W 
• ASIAN WOMAN: AW 
• * if no precise dates assumed that that the charges where a year before the year of 
conviction. 
YEAR CHARGES ASSUMPTIONS* TOTAL 
1997 II I 3 
1998   0 
1999 II  2 
2000 IIIII III 8 
2001 IIII W 5 
2002 IBW I 4 
2003 I  I 
2004 BLIII  5 
2005 WBIBBLBBII I 11 
2006 BBIIWBBI II 10 
2007 WWWII  5 
                                                 
34 Information in Table 1 to Table 5 is drawn form the work I did this summer at the Canadian HIV/AIDS 
Legal Network in Toronto.  
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NO DATE II  2 
 
Since 2005, most of the charges laid are against heterosexual black males and 
against women (See table 2).  In fact, out of the 5 charges brought in 2007, 3 of these 
charges were made against women.  
 
Ontario is the Canadian province with the highest number of prosecutions. In fact, 
28 out of 65 charges were made in Ontario, 10 in British Columbia, 9 in Quebec, 6 in 
Alberta, 6 in Newfoundland and 5 in Manitoba. In Ontario, prosecutions were laid 
prevalently in small cities (London, Kitchener, Hamilton, Waterloo, Guelph, Windsor) 
(see Table 3).  
 
Table 3.  
CHARGES IN SMALL CITIES- ONTARIO 
**Bold: black men; L: Latino, W: women. 
LONDON 2002, 2004, 2006, 2005 
KITCHENER 2001,  
GUELPH  
WINDSOR 2004(L), 2002 
ST-
CATHERINES 
2005,  
TIMMINS 2001,  
HAMILTON 2005, 2006(w), 2006, 2006,  
SUDBURY 2005 
THUNDER 
BAY 
2006 
TOTAL 16 
 
Analysis of the cases shows that the length of sentences ranges from 1 year to 18 
years, no matter if there was actual transmission of the disease or not. Moreover, 
sentences since 2000 harsher since the year 2000. Unfortunately, Canadian courts offer 
no clear explanation for the stiffer sentences they are imposing. However, it can be 
argued, based on Cuerrier35 and since this decision that courts have adopted strong 
sentences with a view to deterrence believing that harsh sentences will achieve this goal. 
The publicity surrounding recent HIV cases36 may have further strengthened this belief 
and thus encouraged courts to continue to use sentencing with the aim of deterrence.  
                                                 
35 Cuerrier, supra note 2.  
36 See e.g. the mass media prosecutions of Trevis Smith a Roughriders’s Football player in Regina: « CFL’s 
HIV sex scandal to play out in Regina Court » January 28, 2007. CTV. Online : 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070128/CFL_HIV_070128?s_name=&no_ads; 
See also, the case Johnson Aziga accused of two first degree murders charges: « Aids back in Spotlight» 
Hamilton Spectator, May 14 2007. Online : http://www.thespec.com/article/198760.  
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Table 4 
LENGTH OF SENTENCES 
18 years 1 
15 years 1 
11 years 1 
10 years 2 
8 years 2 
7 years 1 
6 years 1 
4 years and 8 months 1 
45 months (3.75 years) 1 
40 months 2 
36 months 3 
32 months 1 
24 months 1 
18 months 2 
1 year 2 
 
A comparison between sentences applied in criminal HIV exposures and 
comparable crimes illustrates that sentences in criminal HIV exposures are longer 
compared to crimes of similar severity. The offense of impaired driving can be justifiably 
compared with criminal HIV exposure.37 Both types are comparable because each 
exposes each is punished regardless of whether actual harm occurs.  
 
For impaired driving offense, maximum sentences are short and inexpensive. 
Typically, for the first offence of impaired driving, the fixed maximum fine for the first 
offense is $600; the minimum mandatory imprisonment term for the second offence is 
from 90 to 120 days.38 Statistics from the Canadian Safety Council demonstrate that the 
average length of imprisonment for cases of impaired driving is 73 days.39 Offenders are 
sentenced to prison in only 14 per cent of cases. On the contrary, the range of sentences 
in HIV exposures range from 1 year to 18 years regardless of whether the victim has been 
infected or not. Notwithstanding the fact that impaired driving sentences should maybe 
be longer than they currently are40, comparing HIV criminal sentences with impaired 
driving sentences demonstrates that sentences applied in the context of the 
criminalization of HIV are considerably longer than other similar sentences.41 This 
difference in sentencing term is not explained by the courts, nor is it based in any 
                                                 
37 Criminal Code, supra note 5, at sec. 251(2)(3).  
38 Ibid, at sec S. 253(a). 
39 Satistics. Canada Safety Council. http://www.safetycouncil.org/info/traffic/impaired/progress.html 
[Statistics] 
40 See e.g. Douglas N. Husak “Is Drunk Driving a Serious Offense?” (1994) 23 1 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, at 52-57. 
41 Satistics, supra note 39. 
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principled rationale. The most probable explanation for this difference is that Canadian 
courts believe that the more severe the punishment, the less likely it is for the offender to 
re-engage in the proscribed behaviour, and the more likely the deterrence for potential 
offenders.  
 
In fact, the sentencing in HIV exposure cases is often justified by the principle of 
deterrence.  
  
B. The Deterrence Argument: Growing Reasons to be Skeptical 
Even though deterrence as a principle of sentencing has been applied since the 
eighteenth-century, this paper contends that the deterrence rationale underlying the 
criminalization of HIV/AIDS is solely based on assumptions, which can be proven to be 
false. The assumption is that deterrence, as a goal of sentencing, discourages crime by 
threat or example of punishment.42 The following sections intends to summarize the 
historical background and the theoretical approach of deterrence as a principle of 
sentencing; then to argue that the deterrence rationale is applied in all criminal 
HIV/AIDS cases without any proof that it will really discourage other people living with 
HIV/AIDS from engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse without disclosing their HIV 
status; and finally to rely on the social literature and judicial critique to demonstrate that 
deterrence is not likely to work in criminal HIV/AIDS cases.  
 
1. Deterrence as a Principle of Sentencing 
This section examines the historical background and the theoretical approaches of 
deterrence as a principle of sentencing, its rational as a Common Law principle, and its 
codified objective under s. 718 of the Criminal Code. 
 
The word “deterrence” has been used at least since the eighteenth-century and is 
derived from the Latin verb “deterrere”, meaning to frighten away from.43 Initial attempts 
to formalize the idea of deterrence were made by two reformers, Ceasare Beccaria (1738-
1794) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), who proposed significant reforms to the 
criminal justice system. Both argued that the major goal of the criminal justice system 
should be to prevent future crimes by punishing individuals who have already been 
caught and to threaten members of the broader society who might contemplate 
committing a crime.44 For Braccaria and Bentham, deterrence occurs when the 
punishment attached to the criminal act is applied to offenders. Then, others will 
rationally weigh the disadvantage of criminal behaviour and choose the act resulting in 
the least pain and hence will not commit a crime.  
                                                 
42 R. v. Dixon (1975), 22 A.C.T.R. 13, at 20. [Dixon] 
43 Jack Gibbs. Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence. (New York : Elsevier. 1975) [Gibbs].  
44 Bentham, Jeremy. The Rationale of Punishment. (Edinburg: John Bowring Tait,  1843) [Bentham]. 
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The core argument of Braccaria in On Crimes and Punishment (1764)45 and 
Jeremy Bentham in The Rationales of Punishment (1830)46 is that the criminal justice 
system should operate in a manner that deters potential offenders. Both stress three key 
points. First, the deterrence doctrine believes that suspects should know that they will be 
arrested with certainty. The deterrence rationale places greater emphasis on the certainty 
of conviction rather than on the severity of sentence.47 This means that a potential 
offender is more likely to be deterred if he knows for certain that he will be caught, rather 
than if he knows that the chance of being caught is low but the punishment severe. 
Second, the deterrence doctrine believes that the process of criminal cases should be 
made in a speedy yet efficient manner. It places great emphasis on the efficient operation 
of the criminal justice system, specifically on the reduction in court delays and in the time 
between arrest and trial.48 Third, the deterrence theory believes that those convicted of a 
crime should receive a sentence with an appropriate, but not excessive, amount of 
punishment. In other words, severe sentences do not necessarily proportionally increase 
the deterrence effect.   
 
Canadian Common law courts applied the deterrence rationale prior to being 
enacted in the Criminal Law Code.49 On September 3, 1996, the Parliament of Canada 
enacted Bill C-41, which was the first legislative statement in Canada of what is 
described as the “Purpose and Principles of Sentencing”. The “Purpose and Principles of 
Sentencing’ are set out in section 718, which states:  
 
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, 
along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and 
the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing 
just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: 
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct; 
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing 
offences; 
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; 
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; 
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the 
community; and 
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and 
                                                 
45 Richard Bellamy, ed, On crimes and punishments, and other writings / Cesare Beccaria. (1995) New 
York : Cambridge University Press [Beccaria] 
46 Bentham, supra note 44, at ch. VI.  
47 Ibid.   
48 Malcom Feeley and J. Simon & al. “The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections 
and Its implications”. (1992) 30 Criminology 449-75 [Feeley].  
49 See for example: R. v. Iwanitw; Overton (1959), 127 C.C.C. 40 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Mulvahill (1935), 21 
B.C.A.C. 296; Reg. v. Wilmott  (1969), 70 W.W.R. 365; R. v. Dixon (1975), 22 A.C.T.R. 13; R. v. 
Morrissette (1970), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 307, 75 W.W.R. 644 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Kissick (1969), 70 W.W.R. 365; 
R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 at p. 329, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 193.  
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acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the 
community.50 
 
Importantly, section 718 says that one objective of sentencing is “to deter the 
offender and other persons from committing offences”.51 Nonetheless, it should be noted 
that the Criminal Code does not say that the sole purpose of sentencing is to deter. The 
Criminal Code rather says that the purpose is to impose “just sanctions”, “proportionate 
to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”.52 However, 
we will see in the subsequent section that deterrence as a principle of sentencing is 
applied relentlessly and without any proof of its efficacy in every case of HIV/AIDS non-
disclosure, as if section 718 was in fact saying that the purpose of sentencing is only to 
deter. The next section will explain how judges formulate and apply general deterrence in 
the context of the criminalization of HIV/AIDS. 
2. The Deterrence Argument in Criminal HIV/AIDS Cases 
Advocates of the criminalization of HIV/AIDS, motivated by public health 
concerns, assume that punishment will deter people from conduct that transmits, or risks 
transmitting, HIV/AIDS and will prevent future conduct that risks resulting in HIV 
transmission by dissuading others who might be inclined to imitate the offender’s 
conduct. Furthermore, deterrence as a principle of sentencing seems also to establish and 
promulgate expected norms of behavior through fear that the illegal act could lead to 
imprisonment. In Cuerrier it was argued that the “[…] Criminal Code does have a role to 
play.  Through deterrence it will protect and serve to encourage honesty, frankness and 
safer sexual practices.”53 
 
While each case and its correlative sentencing period are different, the principle 
of deterrence remains present in all HIV criminal cases.  Although this principle is solely 
based on unproven assumptions, it continues to be the principal rationale for 
criminalizing the transmission and exposure of HIV/AIDS.  Furthermore, the deterrence 
argument remains invariable in every criminal HIV-case even though no research has 
been conducted to evaluate its effectiveness. 
 
This section aims to stress the regularity of deterrence rationale without proving its 
efficacy in criminal HIV cases in order to imprison the accused living with HIV/AIDS 
who engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse. In fact, deterrence reasoning has been 
used in a number of cases across Canada before and especially after the Supreme Court 
decision in Cuerrier. All of the cases repeat the same assertion that deterrence is a 
                                                 
50 Criminal Code, supra note 5, at sec. 718. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid, at ss 718.1 and 718.2. See also T.W. Ferris, T.W. Sentencing: Practical Approaches (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 2005) [Ferris]. 
53 Cuerrier, supra note 2, at 147. 
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paramount goal of sentencing in HIV cases. It is crucial to summarize relevant cases to 
demonstrate that deterrence is used persistently without any proof that imprisonment has 
indeed a deterrent effect.  
 
In September 1998 the Supreme Court of Canada released in R. v. Cuerrier54 its first 
judgment dealing with a criminal prosecution of an HIV-positive person for engaging in 
sexual activity without disclosing his HIV-status. Mr. Cuerrier was charged with 
aggravated assault after he had unprotected consensual sex with two different women 
knowing that he had tested positive for HIV. In Cuerrier, Chief justice Cory’s reasoning, 
underlining the importance of the deterrence rational in sentencing non-disclosure of HIV 
offenders, has influenced the subsequent jurisprudence dealing with the criminalization 
of HIV/AIDS: 
 “ […] [criminal] law provides a needed measure of protection in the form 
of deterrence and reflects society's abhorrence of the self-centered 
recklessness and the callous insensitivity of the actions of the respondent 
and those who have acted in a similar manner. The risk of infection and 
death of partners of HIV-positive individuals is a cruel and ever present 
reality. Indeed the potentially fatal consequences are far more invidious 
and graver than many other actions prohibited by the Criminal Code. The 
risks of infection are so devastating that there is a real and urgent need to 
provide a measure of protection for those in the position of the 
complainants. If ever there was a place for the deterrence provided by 
criminal sanctions it is present in these circumstances”55” “The Criminal 
Code does have a role to play. Through deterrence it will protect and 
serve to encourage honesty, frankness and safer sexual practices.”56  
 
Chief Justice Cory’s reasoning is repeated in R. v. Mercer57. In Mercer, the accused 
was convicted of two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm.58 Mercer was 
tested for HIV. His doctor advised him that until the tests results were known, he should 
assume to be a risk to others and use a condom. However, Mercer engaged in unprotected 
sexual intercourse for a short time before receiving the result of his test, and he continued 
after being advised of being HIV-positive without informing the complainant of his HIV-
status. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of six and five years imprisonment. At the 
trial, Marshall J. described Mercer’s crime as one of “monumental proportions” and 
determined that the dominant considerations in sentencing were deterrence and protection 
of the public:  
 
                                                 
54 Ibid. See also Richard Elliott, After Cuerrier: Canadian Criminal Law and the Non-Disclosure of HIV-
Positive Status (Montreal: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 1999). 
55 Ibid, at 72.  
56 Ibid, at 147.  
57 R. v. Mercer (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (N & L C.A.), [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 449 [Mercer]. See also, R. v. 
Summer, [1989] A.J. No. 784 (Prov. Ct.) [Summer] for the same reasoning.  
58 Ibid, Mercer, at 52. 
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“ […] it is difficult to see how a court could fail to exercise its powers 
of dissuasion through a penalty set with general deterrence in mind. In 
my view this is neither counter productive to, nor operating at cross-
purposes with, efforts to stem the spread of the virus. To the contrary 
it is necessarily complementary to the extensive preventative efforts 
being undertaken by every arm of society involved in this pre-
occupying problem. Therefore, in my view, a weighing of arguments 
for and against results in the conclusion that general deterrence must 
be a significant factor in setting sentencing […]”59. 
 
Like Justice Cory in Cuerrier, Marshal J. in Mercer offers an explanation as to 
why the deterrence argument has an important bearing in formulation of these sentences, 
but does not offer convincing arguments. Marshal J. claims criminal law is 
complementary to public health effort to dissuade others who may be otherwise inclined 
to imitate the offender’s conduct, but he does not demonstrate that deterrence in HIV-
criminal cases is in fact successful. 
 
In 2001, Chief justice O’Regan in R. v. Williams also assumed that deterrence is a 
primary goal of sentencing where the offender failed to inform his partner of his HIV-
positive status prior to engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse. 60 Akin to previously 
discussed cases, O’Regan does not explain how deterrence rationale is successful.  
 
In 2007, the deterrence argument is used again without any explanation as to how 
criminalization is effective in terms of deterrence. In R. v. Smith61, the Provincial Court 
sentenced Mr. Smith to three-and-a-half years to a charge of sexual assault. Mr. Smith 
had consensual unprotected sex with the complainant many times over several months 
while knowing he was HIV-positive and without disclosing his status to the complainant. 
The woman had not contracted the virus. He apologized for his conduct during the 
proceedings and admitted he did not disclose his HIV-status to his girl friend because he 
feared she would reject him.62 In this case, Bellrose J. admits that, “[i]n an ideal society, 
health departments, through their notification process, through their calling in of 
individuals whom they suspect to have HIV, informing them as to what they should do or 
should not do, challenging them to be responsible for their [HIV status]”63 would be 
sufficient to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. Regardless of the specific facts of the case, 
Bellrose J. applies the theory of deterrence without any explanation: “Deterrence, general 
                                                 
59 Ibid, at 79.  
60 R. v. William [2000] N.J. No. 138, at 17. [Williams]. 
61 R. v. Smith [2004] B.C.J. No. 2736 [Smith]. 
62 Ibid, at 51. 
63 Ibid, at 271.  
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deterrence and specific deterrence plays a crucial role when it comes to sentencing for 
aggravated assault by way of non-disclosure of HIV status.”64  
 
In R. v. Booth65, the deterrence argument is applied again without clarifications. In 
this case, the victim requested that the accused receive a custody sentence of one day 
despite the case law that establishes a sentencing range of one year to twenty months for 
an offence under Section 180 of the Criminal Code. As the victim explained to the court, 
she wanted him to receive a lighter sentence because she knew that the accused did not 
intend to transmit his HIV. Notwithstanding the victim’s request, Fraser J. disagreed with 
the complainant’s submission: “It would be undesirable and wrong for this Court to 
[impose] a substantially lighter sentence than appropriate thereby reducing the deterrent 
value and the court's and public's denunciation of this crime”.66 Unfortunately, Fraser J. 
rather than offering clarity as to what are the deterrence effects on Mr Booth himself, or 
on individuals who are likely to commit the same act, Fraser J.’s solely says “deterrence 
[…] is so important in this type of offence” without giving any explanation as to how 
such deterrence is achieved.67 
Yet again, in R. v. J.M.68, the accused, a woman who twice engaged in sexual 
intercourse with two men was sentenced to a one-year conditional sentence with house 
arrest and a lengthy probation order. At trial, it was demonstrated that J.M. was suffering 
from a mood disorder with hypomania features at the time of the offense.69 
Notwithstanding J.M.’s documented psychiatric problems accepted by both the crown 
and defense experts, Fuerts J. repeats the statement that deterrence as a principle of 
sentencing is crucial in this type of offense, without offering proof that deterrence has an 
important bearing in dissuading people.70  
 
In the two most recent decisions regarding the criminalization of HIV, Bellrose J. 
in R. v. Smith71 and Grans J. in R v. Walkem72 reiterate that general deterrence and 
specific deterrence plays a very crucial role in situations where a person had unprotected 
sexual intercourse without disclosing ones HIV status.73  Yet again, no proof is offered as 
to the efficacy of deterrence in this type of offense.  
 
A review of the decisions discussed above leads inexorably to the conclusion that, 
in the context of HIV, deterrence is a dominant consideration applied in all cases. In none 
                                                 
64 Ibid, at par. 271.  
65 R. v. Booth, [2005] A.J. No. 792 (Prov. Ct.). [Booth] 
66 Ibid, at 4. 
67 Ibid, at  9.  
68 R. v. J.M., [2005] O.J. No. 5649  [J.M.]. 
69 Ibid, at 11-16.  
70 Ibid, at 28.  
71  Smith, supra note 61.  
72 R v. Walkem [2007] O.J. No. 186 (A.M. Gans J). [Walkem] 
73 Ibid, at 21; see also Smith, supra note 61, at 127. 
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of the cases discussed above, is it explained how deterrence operates, especially in new 
areas of law such as the criminalization of HIV where the efficacy of legal rules in 
deterring harmful conduct has never been verified.  
 
As demonstrated above, although deterrence as a goal of sentencing may seem a 
compelling strategy to dissuade people likely to engage in unprotected sex without 
disclosing their HIV-status through the fear of imprisonment, its effectiveness rests solely 
on assumptions. Canadian courts may place too much reliance on the use of the 
deterrence theory, while nothing proves that deterrence is effective. In fact, the next 
section will show that although the principle of deterrence is used consistently in all of 
the cases cited above, there are a number of reasons why the criminalization of 
HIV/AIDS transmissions and exposures may not ultimately serve as a deterrent.    
3. Social Science and Judicial Critique 
There is little or no evidence to sustain an empirically justified belief in the 
deterrent efficacy of legal sanction. As this section contends, there is, on the contrary, 
strong evidence to question the criminal law’s deterrent effect and the ability to deter via 
criminal law rules and penalties. Many Canadian courts and social science research 
studies on sentencing have cautioned against over-reliance on deterrence as a principle of 
sentencing and have recognized that the deterrence value of sentencing is speculative.74 
This paper goes further and suggests that the deterrence strategy is a poor one for three 
reasons: potential offenders do not know the legal rules; they do not make rational 
choices; and/or they do not perceive the exact cost for a violation as greater than 
perceived gain.75 This section outlines each of these hurdles and suggests that any one of 
these blocks the apparent deterrent effect. 
 
First, to be deterred, the offender needs to know the law. Available studies suggest 
however that most people do not know legal rules.76 In fact, the deterrence doctrine in its 
assumption that it is possible to widely disseminate information about sentences imposed 
in particular cases, is proven to be wrong.77 For Paul H. Robinson, Professor at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School and David P. Farrington, Professor of 
Psychology and Public Affairs at the Princeton University, who have conducted empirical 
studies, potential offenders do not have a good grasp of the severity of penalties to 
                                                 
74 See for example Research Reports on the Canadian Sentencing Commission (The Archambault Report). 
“Legal Sanctions and deterrence”. (Ottawa: Research and Development Directorate. Department of Justice, 
1988). [The Archambault Report]  
75 Paul H. Robinson. “Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science investigation” (2004) 24 2 Oxford 
J. Legal Stud. 173 [Robinson (2004)] 
76 A. von Hirsh “ Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent Research” (2001) 39 
Alta. L. Rev. 597-605. [von Hirsh] 
77 Robinson Paul H; John M Darley. “The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: 
At Its Worst...” (2003) 91 5 Geo. L. J. 949, at p. 954 [Robinson 2003]. 
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various crimes.78 Even people who think they know the law, are frequently wrong.79 
Indeed, repeat offenders who would have a greater incentive to know the law, do not 
know it.80 Put another way, individuals are generally completely ignorant of what the law 
is: 
“Potential offenders typically do not read law books and their ability to 
learn the law, even indirectly through hearing or reading of particular 
cases, is limited by the fact that the legal rule is just one of hundreds of 
variables that influence a case disposition. To divine the operative liability 
rule, hidden as it is under the effects of all the other variables, would 
require both higher numbers of reported cases than those to which 
potential offenders are exposed and a mind for complex calculation 
beyond that which is reasonable to expect”.81  
 
Furthermore, since individuals have minimal knowledge of the penalties for 
various crimes, they cannot be deterred. In other words, if individuals are ignorant about 
criminal law rules, it seems unrealistic to think that those rules will effectively deter 
individuals from committing a prohibited act. Punitive measures alone, without being 
known by potential offenders, cannot have a deterrent effect. For instance, in a recent 
report on impaired driving published by the Department of Justice, Donelson asserts that 
"law-based, punitive measures alone cannot produce large, sustained reductions in the 
magnitude of [crimes]".82 In the context of consensual sex, it is extremely doubtful that 
an exemplary sentence imposed in a particular case will have an effect in deterring 
potential offenders.83 Where the prohibited conduct is the expression of sufficiently 
compulsive drives or motivations, deterrence is often not possible at all.84  
 
Second, to be deterred, individuals need to make a rational choice at the time of 
the offense. In other words, even if the individual understands the law and its implication, 
the offender needs to bring this knowledge to bear on his conduct at the time of the 
offense. Available data suggest that the possibility to make a rational choice will depend 
on several factors: the context in which the need for the decision arises85, the particular 
personality of the offender86. and mental abnormalities.87 In the particular context of this 
                                                 
78 Robinson (2004), supra note 77 at 176; David P. Farrington, “Human Development and Criminal 
Carrers” (1997) Oxford Handbook of Criminology, at p. 361 [Farrington]. 
79 Ibid, supra note 75 at 173.  
80 Robinson (2204) supra note 75; O. Dahlbeck “Criminality and Risk-taking” (1990) 11 Personality and 
Individual Differences, at 265.  
81 Ibid, at 954. 
82 A.C Donelson, D.J Beirness & al. “Alcohol and Fatal Road Accidents in Canada:  A Statistical Look at 
its Magnitude and Persistence”  (1985) Impaired Driving report No. 3. (Ottawa, Ontario:  The Department 
of Justice, Canada), at 221-222. 
83 The Archambault Report, supra note 74.  
84 H. L. Packer. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction. (Stanford : Standford University Press, 1968), at 45 
[Packer]. 
85 Robinson (2004), supra note 75 at 179. 
86 Micheal R. Gottfredson and Travis Hirsh. A General Theory of Crime, 1990. 
87 Robinson (2004), supra note 74 at 180.  
 
Anne MERMINOD, “The Deterrence Rational in the Criminalization of HIV/AIDS” 
 
Droits d’auteur et droits de reproduction. Toutes les demandes de reproduction doivent être 
acheminées à Copibec (reproduction papier) – (514) 288-1664 – 1(800) 717-2022. 
licences@copibec.qc.ca 
 
18
paper, to bear such an understanding on his conduct at the time of a consensual sexual 
intercourse is especially difficult. Indeed, when it comes to sex, few people seem to be 
rational actors.88 Furthermore, situations factors working against disclosure include 
engaging in sex in environments that implicitly discourage verbal communication 
between partners, engaging in sex as a means to procure money or drugs, or engaging in 
sex in situations of coercion. All of these factors are not taken in account by Canadian 
courts and reduce the reliability of deterrence as a mean of encouraging disclosure to the 
prospective partner.  
 
In fact, contrary to common belief, prosecutions laid against HIV-positive people 
are drawn from an array of different circumstances and not exclusively from reckless 
disregard for the lives and safety of others.  This argument is better illustrated by real life 
examples. The following cases studies are inspired by people I met during my internship 
at the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network in Toronto.89 They demonstrate that non 
disclosure may occur in particular circumstances; related to sex work or as a result of fear 
of violence, fear of rejection, mental illness or intoxication through alcohol or drug.  
 
Lyne is 23 years old. She was 18 years old when she contracted HIV from a 
former partner who was not aware of his HIV status. The news of her seropositivity had a 
devastating effect on her. Since then, she became depressed, lonely, and regularly refused 
dating because of fear of being rejected after disclosing her illness. One day, however, 
she met Carl. Initially, she tried resisting his flirtatious behaviour but after few weeks 
accepted to have dinner with him. Their romance began that night. She refused to have 
sex because Carl insisted to have unprotected sex with her. Lyne told him several times 
that she wanted to use a condom. Carl categorically refused by telling her that “it didn’t 
feel the same” with a condom. First, it was easy for her to say “no”. Carl continued to 
forcefully ask for unprotected sexual intercourse. She resisted for another few months, 
afraid to be rejected if she disclosed her HIV-status. After Carl told her that his patience 
was reaching its limit, she felt that he would leave her. She accepted to have unprotected 
sex with him.  
 
Carmen is a sex worker and a single mother of three. She has been HIV positive 
since 2003. One night, a client insisted on having unprotected sex even though she had 
made it clear that she would not. He told her he would pay three times extra if they did 
not use a condom. She accepted, because she needed the money. 
 
Nathalie has been married to John since the summer of 2006. John was already an 
abusive boyfriend, but following their marriage the violence escalated, particularly when 
                                                 
88 Dalton Harlton. Criminal law. Aids and the Law : A Guide for the Public, at 242 [Dalton]. 
89 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network. Online : http://www.aidslaw.ca/. For their anonymity, their real 
names are kept anonymous.   
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he was drunk. After a few months of feeling sick, she went to see her doctor. The doctor 
suggested an HIV test which turned out to be positive. Nathalie knew that if she disclosed 
her serostatus to her husband he would beat her. On her return from her doctors office, 
she was too afraid to disclose her HIV status to him. That night, they had unprotected 
sex. 
 
In theory, people in such situations are all subject to criminal prosecution because 
all of them had unprotected sex without disclosing their HIV status. Importantly, criminal 
law operates blindly: no matter whether the accused actually had criminal intent (mens 
rea) to expose his/her partner to the risk of HIV/AIDS at the time of the act; no matter if 
the accused knew that his/her act was criminal; and no matter that his/her partner 
contracted HIV. As it was noted in the case studies, instances where persons know that 
they are HIV-positive but do not disclose may be less a matter of a conscious effort to 
deceive, as the application of the criminal law suggests, and more a matter of denial, 
concerns over potentials repercussions of disclosure, or fear of rejection.  
 
Moreover, recent studies of human judgment suggest that human beings place less 
weight on events in the future as compared to events in the present.90 Drugs or alcohol, 
even taken in moderate quantity, exacerbate the perception that future events are less 
important.91 It seems fair to say that if the decision in question is whether to disclose the 
HIV status and probably abstain from sex, or not to disclose and engage in sexual 
intercourse, the distant possibility of being punished by the judicial system might receive 
less weight, especially if alcohol or drug was consumed.92 As behavioural studies 
demonstrate, people are prone to take immediate gains even if the costs in the future 
involve consequences.93 Rules do not deter, even those expressively made to influence 
conduct.94 
 
Third, supporters of the deterrence doctrine assume that punishment can act as a 
negative inducement by discouraging people from engaging in behaviour that violates the 
law.95 To be discouraged, offenders need to perceive the cost of violation and expect 
punishment as greater than the perceived benefit. The perceived cost is the threatened 
punishment and the weight the potential offender gives to it. The perceived benefit is 
what the offender expects to gain from committing the offence. 
 
The perception of the cost of violation can be further altered by drug or alcohol 
                                                 
90 George Loewenstein. “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behaviour”(1996) 65 Org Behav & Human 
Dec Proc 272-79.  
91 Robinson (2004), supra note 75 at 174. 
92 Ibid, at 178. 
93 Lee Ross & Richard Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology (1991).  
94 Robinson (2004), supra note 75, at 174. 
95 See for example, H. Grasmick & R. Bursik. “Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice : 
Extending the Reference Model” (1990) 24 Law & Soc’y Rev, at 841; Grasmick, H. , & Green, D. E. 
“Legal punishment, social disapproval, and internalization as inhibitors of illegal behavior” (1990) 71 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 325. 
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consumption or by mental health problems. Mental health problems can affect anybody, 
but science reports have shown that people with HIV are more likely to experience a 
range of neurological and mental health issues over the course of their lives.96 For 
instance, the Laboratory of Neuro-Imaging in the Department of Neurology at the 
University of California School of Medicine reports that 40% of people living with 
HIV/AIDS suffer from one or more neurological symptoms, which can be associated 
with mental illness.97 The high prevalence of neurological symptoms and mental illness 
among people living with HIV/AIDS is explained by the fact that the acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) produces proteins that cause brain cells to die.98 
The more common neurological impairments are feelings of acute emotional distress, 
confusion, depression, anxiety, behavioural change, dementia and cognitive disorders.99 
Other severe neurological problems include seizures,  and coordination, and walking 
deficit, which will get progressively worse as the disease develops.100  
A person suffering from a neurological problem associated with a mental illness 
does not have the same perception of the costs and benefits of an offense, and these 
symptoms can definitely be factors working against disclosure of the person’s HIV status. 
This paper, on the basis of this, argues that if it can be proven that a person suffers from  
a mental illness associated with the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), the 
“specific” deterrence rationale is inefficient in dissuading this individual in the future, 
and should not be used at sentencing.  Similarly, the “general” deterrence rationale is also 
unlikely to be effective in incapacitating 40% of HIV-positive people who experience 
neurological and/or mental illness. 
  
With respect to the severity of punishment, there is no conclusive evidence that 
supports the conclusion that harsh sentences would reduce crime through the mechanism 
                                                 
96 See for example Marie-Josée Brouillette, Kenneth Citron, editors. HIV & psychiatry : a training and 
resource manual, (1997) Ottawa : Canadian Psychiatric Association [Brouillette]; E. Zweben, Patt 
Denning. The alcohol and drug wildcard : substance use and psychiatric problems in people with HIV. San 
Francisco, CA : Aids Health Project, University of California San Francisco, c1998; Dawn McGuire, MD. 
“Neurologic manifestation of HIV”. (2003) San Francisco: University of California San. Online: 
http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/InSite?page=kb-04-01-02.; National Institute of Neurological Disorders and 
Stroke. “Neurological Complications of Aids” (2007) Bethesda (MD). Online: 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/aids/aids.htm#What_is . 
97 Paul M. Thompson, Rebecca A. Dutton, Kiralee M. Hayashi & all. “Thinning of the cerebral cortex 
visualized in HIV reflects CD4 T lymphocyte decline”, (2005) 102 43 Neuroscience. PNAS, 15647.  
98 Dawn McGuire, MD. “Neurologic manifestation of HIV”. (2003) San Francisco: University of California 
San. Online: http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/InSite?page=kb-04-01-02; « HIV link to demandtia explained ». BBC, 
Tuesday, 20 April, 2004. Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3638809.stm 
99 Brouillette, supra note 96, at p. 30, 88, 110, 128.  
100 M. Kaul & J. MZheng « HIV-1 infection and AIDS: consequences for the central nervous system” 
(2005) 12 Cell Death and Differentiation (2005), at 878–892. Online: 
http://www.nature.com/cdd/journal/v12/n1s/pdf/4401623a.pdf.  
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of “general” deterrence.101 Although this is a difficult subject upon which to conduct 
research, it appears that a harsh punishment (imprisonment) is not a more effective 
deterrent than a milder punishment (probation).102 In fact, it is shown that "recorded 
offence rates do not vary inversely with the severity of penalties (usually measured by the 
length of imprisonment)" and "inverse relations between crime and severity (when found) 
are usually smaller than inverse crime-certainty relations".103  In other terms, “long prison 
terms are more likely to be more impressive “to lawmakers than lawbreakers.”104 A study 
conducted in the United States compared the recurrence rates of people sentenced to 
probation and others sentenced to prison.105  The two groups were comparable in terms of 
background variables that might be related to recurrence (such as criminal history, 
seriousness of the crime committed). The results showed that the probationers had lower, 
not higher recidivism rates than individuals who had been sent to prison.106 
 
Canadian judicial decisions outside of HIV cases have also shown skepticism as to 
the harsh sentence as deterrent. For instance, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. held in R. v. 
Proulx107: 
“[…] although imprisonment is intended to serve the traditional 
sentencing goals of separation, deterrence, denunciation, and 
rehabilitation, there is widespread consensus108 that imprisonment has not 
been successful in achieving some of these goals. Over-incarceration is a 
long-standing problem that has been many times publicly acknowledged 
but never addressed in a systematic manner by Parliament. In recent 
years, compared to other countries, sentences of imprisonment in Canada 
have increased at an alarming rate.”109 
 
Similarly,  Lamer J. stated:  
 
                                                 
101 See for example : Isaac Ehrlich. “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis,” 
Journal of Political Economy 81, 1973, at 521-64;  Morgan O. Reynolds. “Does Punishment Deter?”. 
(1998) 148 National Center for Policy Analyst. Policy Backgrounder, at  3-14. 
102 Julian V. Roberts, David Cole, eds. Making Sense of Sentencing (1998, U. of T. Press) [Roberts] 
103 D Beyleveld. A Bibliography on General Deterrence Research. (1980). (Farmborough:  
Saxon House), at 306. 
104 Michael K. Block and Vernon E. Garety, “Some Experimental Evidence on Differences between 
Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk” Journal of Legal Studies 24, January 1995, 
at 123-38.  
105 Roberts, supra note 102 at 59.  
106 Joyce Peterson & al. Prison Versus Probation in California: Implications for Crime and Offender 
Recidivism.   
107 R. v. Proulx  (2000), 140 C.C.C. (3.d) 449, per Lamer C.J.C. (S.C.C.) [Proulx]. 
108 In their reasons, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. reviewed numerous studies that uniformly concluded that 
incarceration is costly, frequently unduly harsh and "ineffective, not only in relation to its purported 
rehabilitative goals, but also in relation to its broader public goals" (para. 54). See also Report of the 
Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (1969); Archambault 
Report, supra note 74. 
109 Proulx, supra note 107, at 57. 
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Incarceration, which is ordinarily a harsher sanction, may provide more 
deterrence than a conditional sentence. Judges should be wary, however, 
of placing too much weight on deterrence when choosing between a 
conditional sentence and incarceration ... The empirical evidence 
suggests that the deterrent effect of incarceration is uncertain ... 
Moreover, a conditional sentence can provide significant deterrence if 
sufficiently punitive conditions are imposed and the public is made aware 
of the severity of these sentences.110 
 
 
In addition, in R.v. Gladue, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. held that although imprisonment 
is intended to serve the goals of separation, deterrence, denunciation and rehabilitation, 
“there is widespread consensus that imprisonment has not been successful in achieving 
some of these goals.”111 
 
Finally, in R. v. Hamilton112 the criminologist Dr A. Doob gave expert evidence at 
the sentencing hearing on the impact of variation in the severity of sentences on crime.  
Lamer J. maintained that Dr Doob’s demonstrated that there was no conclusive evidence 
that supported the conclusion that harsh sentences would reduce crime through the 
mechanism of general deterrence. At the question “Can we conclude that variation in the 
severity of sentences would have differential (general) deterrent effects?” Dr. A Doob 
answered: “No. There is no conclusive evidence that supports the conclusion that harsh 
sentences would reduce crime through the mechanism of general deterrence.”113 
 
After demonstrating that social research and judicial decisions agree that harsh 
sentences do not reduce crimes, hence do not deter; There remains one question to be 
conclusively answered: Why is it that sentences for HIV-positive people having engaged 
in unprotected sex without disclosing their HIV-status always include imprisonment and 
are harsher than similar offences?  
 
In conclusion, scientific research shows that the effect of deterrence on potential 
offenders is minimal or even non-existent, because offenders do not know the law, do 
not make rational choices at the time of the offense, and because offenders do not 
perceive the cost of violation. Hence, the deterrence rationale is not likely a vehicle for 
dissuading sero-positive people from having unprotected sexual intercourse without 
disclosing their HIV status.  Furthermore, it was shown that factors such as the 
environment, mental illness or neurological problems, situations of coercion can affect 
the efficacy of the deterrent rationale. As the case studies underscored, not disclosing 
                                                 
110 Ibid, at 489-493.  
111 R. v. Gladue (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385, at p. 409 (S.C.C.) [Gladue].  
112 R. v. Hamilton (2003), 172 C.C.C. (3d) 114 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Hamilton].  
113 Ibid, at 120. 
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one’s HIV status is not deceit per se and is not planned or deliberate like other criminal 
offense are. 
 
Skepticism over the role of deterrence in our sentencing regime is also evident in 
the case law.114 In fact, several judges openly skeptical of deterrence as a goal of 
sentencing have recognized that deterrence is speculative and have cautioned against 
over-reliance on deterrence as a principle of sentencing: 115  R. v. Wismayer is a case in 
point: “[…] general deterrent effect of incarceration has been and continues to be 
speculative and […] there are other ways to give effect to the objective of general 
deterrence.” 116 In R. v. Biancofiore “The general deterrent effect of incarceration is 
somewhat speculative […] incarceration should be used with great restraint where the 
justification is general deterrence.”117 In R v. Parker. “General deterrence and 
denunciation should be weighed in conjunction with sentencing objectives once 
preconditions for conditional sentence are met rather than in relation to danger to 
community.”118  
 
If social science and several judicial decisions are openly skeptical of the efficacy 
of deterrence, it is justified to ask again: Why is deterrence always applied as the 
rationale to the criminalization of behaviours that risk transmission of HIV/AIDS? 
Neither criminal prosecution nor imprisonment are an appropriate means to protect 
society from HIV-infected persons who did not disclose their HIV status before engaging 
in consensual unprotected sex.  
 
C. Concerns Regarding the Criminalization of HIV/AIDS 
After the review of the judicial and non-judicial literature, it seems fair to 
conclude that deterrence is solely a theoretical justification for criminalizing exposure or 
transmission to HIV/AIDS, but that it is unlikely to be matched by any significant 
deterrent effect in practice. In most cases where the criminal law has been used against 
people living with HIV, there was no motive or advance planning of HIV exposure. 
Spontaneous behaviours driven by human anguish, despair, fear of rejection or passion 
are difficult to prevent and the criminal law is not the adequate vehicle to do it. In other 
words, there is no reason to believe either that criminalizing transmission or exposures to 
HIV will have any significant general deterrent effect.  
                                                 
114 See for example United States v. Burns. (2001), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 129-30 and 150 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Proulx, supra note 106 (2000); R. v. Harrison and Garrison, [1978] 1.W.W.R. 162, at p. 164 (B.C.C.A.); 
R. v. W. (L.F.) (1998), 119 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Nfdl. C.A.); R. v. Ursel (1998), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 289 
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Parker (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 418 (N.S.C.A) [Parker]; R. v. Biancofiore (1997), 119 
C.C.C. (3d) 344 (Ont. C.A) [Biancofiore]; Gladue, supra note 107; R. v. H. (C.N.) (2000), 170 C.C.C. 
(3.d.) 253, at. 265 (Ont. C.A).; R. v. Hamilton (2003), 172 C.C.C. (3d) 114 (Ont. S.C.J.).  
115 Proulx, supra note 107; R. v. Wismayer (1997) 115 C.C.C. (3d) 18, at p. 40 (Ont. CA.) [Wismayer] R. v. 
Hamilton (2003), 172 C.C.C. (3d) A. Crim. R. 53 
116 Wismayer (1997), supra note 115.  
117 Biancofiore, supra note 114, at 23.  
118 Parker, supra note 114. 
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This paper not only argues that the criminalization of HIV is ineffective in 
achieving the goal of deterrence, it further contends that such criminalization is 
counterproductive as it creates a disincentive for HIV testing, as well as undermining 
public health services and prevention efforts. Several ways have been identified where 
criminal HIV disclosure laws impede rather than complement public health efforts to 
stem the spread of HIV/AIDS. As Professor Carol Galletly and Professor Steven 
Pinkerton from the Center for AIDS Intervention Research at the Medical College of 
Wisconsin's (Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine) state: “[…] 
criminalization of HIV not only fails to complement public health prevention efforts to 
promote condom use, they appear to undermine them."119 In fact, HIV-related criminal 
laws not only undermine public health efforts, they may even contribute to multiplying 
HIV transmissions for three reasons. First, criminalization of HIV may dissuade people 
from getting tested as well as discourage education and undermine counseling efforts 
targeted at changing behaviour to reduce the risk of transmission. Second, criminalizing 
HIV stigmatizes people living with HIV/AIDS, a group already socially, culturally and/or 
economically marginalized, which may lead to further human rights abuses. Third, 
imprisoning a person living with HIV does not prevent them from spreading the virus, 
either through conjugal visits or through high-risk behaviours with other prisoners.  
 
1. Disincentive to Testing and Counseling Efforts 
In Canadian law, if the person does not know that he/she is HIV positive, he/she 
cannot be criminally charged for having engaged in consensual unprotected sexual 
intercourse. Because the law applies only to people knowing their status, criminal law 
may be a powerful disincentive for voluntary testing. In fact, the limited evidence 
available suggests that the criminal law will inhibit people from seeking testing.120 Even 
when confronted with this evidence, the Supreme Court of Canada preferred the 
traditional position suggesting that it is unlikely that individuals will forego testing due to 
the possibility of facing criminal charges because “people want to know whether they are 
infected or not and whether any treatment is available.”121 
 
Contrary to the Supreme Court, many have expressed their concern about the 
negative consequence of the threat of criminal prosecution as a disincentive to getting 
tested. Doctor Doug Sider, an associate medical officer of Health for the Niagara region, 
has expressed concerns that criminalization may lead some people to “stick their heads in 
                                                 
119 Galletly, CL. & SD Pinkerton. “Conflicting messages: how criminal HIV disclosure laws undermine 
public health efforts to control the spread of HIV”. (2006) 10 AIDS Behav. 451−461 [Galletly]. 
120 See for example David W. Webber. Aids and the Law. Fourth ed. (Aspen: Waltons Klewers) at p. 263 
and Lazzarini, supra note 20 at 23; Lawrence O. Gostin & James Hodge. “Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in 
HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases. Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partners 
Notification”. (1998) 5 9 Duke J. Gender L & Pol’y., at p. 6. 
121 Cuerrier, supra note 2 at 143, see also Marshall J. in Mercer at par. 76;  Holland, supra note 16 at 288.  
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the sand and avoid getting tested: They may think, if I don't get tested, I can't be 
charged".122 This idea is repeated in R. v. Napora, where the Court acknowledged that 
criminalizing informed and consensual but unprotected high-risk sexual activity may 
have the negative effect of discouraging people from getting tested for HIV antibodies: 
"if a person knew that they might be charged criminally with having consensual, 
unprotected, high risk sex, they may decide not to get tested, not to get tested under their 
real names, or not to go back to the clinic to receive their test results”.123 In fact, a recent 
study by the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services observed that more than 
half of the people tested positive for HIV infection did not return to receive their test 
results.124  As GH Herek has noted “people will not seek HIV-related counseling, testing, 
treatment and support if this would mean facing discrimination, lack of confidentiality, 
feeling stigmatized […] Coercive public health measures drive away the people most in 
need of such services and fail to achieve their public health goals of prevention through 
behavioural change, care and support”.125 Moreover, people unaware of their HIV-
positive status may be more likely to engage in high-risk behaviours and, therefore, may 
increase the spread of HIV transmission.126  
 
In fact, US Centres for Disease Control (CDC) estimate that 25% of those HIV-
infected in the US do not know their status since they did not get tested and note that "if 
asked, a substantial proportion of persons with HIV would report that they are HIV-
negative or do not know their HIV status." The CDC have recently calculated that these 
25% are responsible for up to 70% of sexually transmitted HIV infections.127 
 
If people do not get tested because of fear of being criminally charged, they also 
do not seek counseling. The counseling is primordial to reduce the risky behaviours and 
to help the person disclose their HIV status to their partners. As was shown in this 
section, the criminal law may undermines access to such support and thus goes contrary 
to the public health policy intent on protecting the society. 
2. Reinforcing the Stigmas Attached to HIV/AIDS 
HIV/AIDS has always been accompanied by fear, denial, stigma and 
discrimination. People living with HIV are discriminated in many spheres of their lives 
such as employment, housing, health care, immigration or entry to foreign countries.128 
The disease often results in stigmatization, repression and discrimination, and individuals 
                                                 
122 “Worried potential victims come forward in HIV case” Hamilton Spectator (December 2005). (Napora 
was charged in 2005. He did not receive a sentence yet. 
123 R. v. Napora.(1995) 36 Alta. L. R. (3d) 22 [Napora] 
124 Los Angeles County Department of Health Services. Kaiser Network. HIV-positive People Not 
Obtaining Test Results. July 30, 2003. The Body. Online: http://www.thebody.com/content/art11712.html.    
125 GM Herek et al. “Related Stigmas and Knowledge in the United States : prevalence and Trends, 1991-
1999”. American Journal of Public Health. (2002), 92, at p. 371-377. 
126 Lazzarini, supra note 20, at 250.  
127 US centres for Disease Control. « Untested HIV-positive individuals more than twice as likely to engage 
in high-risk sex than those aware of their HIV-positive status” Aidsmap. Online : http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/;  
128 For example, a HIV-positive Canadian citizen cannot visit the U.S.  
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affected by HIV/AIDS are often rejected by their families, their loved ones and their 
communities. In many societies, people living with HIV/AIDS are often seen as shameful 
and associated with minority groups or minority behaviours (homosexuality for 
example). HIV/AIDS may also be linked to 'perversion' or personal irresponsibility.129 
Sometimes, HIV/AIDS is believed to bring shame upon the family or the community.  
 
A personal experience helps to illustrate the rejection which seropositive people 
may experience. When I was working at Maison Plein Coeur, a day center in Montreal 
for people living with HIV/AIDS, someone told me that he would rather have cancer or 
diabetes than HIV/AIDS, because if he would suffer from those illnesses rather than 
HIV/AIDS he would receive some support by his friends and family. Rejection is a 
common experience in the life of people living with HIV. 
 
Laws, rules and policies can increase the stigmatization of people living with 
HIV/AIDS; this is the case with the criminalization of HIV/AIDS in Canada130. The 
criminalization of HIV/AIDS reinforces stigmas in three ways. First, the criminal charges 
and prosecution are often accompanied by inflammatory and ill-informed media coverage 
including the release of personal data including pictures of the persons charged. As a 
matter of fact, in the 65 charges made against people living with HIV, 21 of the cases 
where the subject of such media coverage.  
 
Table 5.  
CASES WHERE THE PERSON'S PICTURE WAS RELEASED 
Men 
Caucasians 6 / 43 
Blacks 9 / 12 
Latinos 1 / 02 
Women 
Caucasians 1 / 07 
 
Natives 2 / 07 
 
Asian 1/ 07 
 TOTAL : 21 
 
 
Second, as Table 5 demonstrates, when the media releases the picture of the 
person charged, the person is often a member of a visible minority although most 
prosecutions involve Caucasians (see Table 1, p.10). The fact that the media are more 
prone to release the picture of a person from a visible minority contributes to the existing 
stigmas that HIV/AIDS is propagated by certain minority groups.  
                                                 
129 Gilmore, Norbert and Margaret Somerville “Stigmatization, scapegoating and discrimination in sexually 
transmitted diseases: Overcoming ‘them’ and ‘us’.” (1994) 39 9 Social Science and Medicine, at 1349-1350 
[Somerville] 
130 Ibid, at 1342. 
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Third, media coverage contributes to the portrayal of people living with 
HIV/AIDS as potential criminals and a threat to the general public. In the Canadian 
media, sero-positive people who have been charged (but not yet pronounced guilty) are 
often subject to the release of confidential data, including the person’s picture,  name, 
age, city and work place, as well as detailed information regarding to their sexual 
practices. Such public disclosures highlight the distinction between people living with 
HIV/AIDS and those uninfected people for whom consensual sexual activities are private 
and not subject to public scrutiny. Moreover, the release of personal information clearly 
infringes upon their right to privacy- particularly if the person has not yet been 
convicted.131 The police justify this infringement by explaining that their procedure is 
aimed at alerting the population that the person might be dangerous.132 It is important to 
note here that the picture is often released even though the person has only engaged in 
consensual sex with one or two partners over a period of many years, and hence is not 
dangerous to the public at large.133 This overly broad use of media coverage tends to send 
a misinformed message to the public reinforcing the false-impression that people living 
with HIV/AIDS are dangerous. As Carol L. Galletly has put it, HIV/AIDS criminal laws 
perpetuate the “us versus them” dichotomy that is central to prevailing theories of 
stigma.134 . Furthermore, criminalizing HIV/AIDS sends a message that the responsibility 
to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS falls on people living with HIV/AIDS and not on 
everyone. 
 
Fourth, there may be discrimination in prosecution and sentencing. Fear and 
prejudice can also taint sentencing for criminal HIV exposure. For example, prosecution 
can be fuelled by the fact that the individual is from a minority group in a predominantly 
white community. 
 
Discriminating and stigmatizing attitudes towards persons with HIV/AIDS are 
identified as a barrier both to prevention efforts and to achievement of a fair and 
compassionate response to persons affected.135 Fear of stigmatizing reactions may 
discourage people living with HIV/AIDS from seeking testing or treatment or from 
admitting their HIV status publicly or to their partners.136 Consequently, stigmatization is 
detrimental to efforts to prevent further HIV transmissions. The laws may reinforce HIV-
related stigma and potentially alienate people upon whom prevention efforts depend. In 
summary, to the extent that HIV disclosure laws reinforce stigma among people living 
                                                 
131 See e.g., Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa inc., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 
132 The Spectator. 13 March 2000.   
133 See for e.g. Booth, supra note 107; R. v. DeBlois, [2005] O.J. No. 2267 (Ct. of J.); R v Edwards [2001] 
NSSC 80. 24; R. v. Nduwayo  [2006] B.C.J. No. 3418; R. v. William [2006] O.J. No. 5037. 
134 Galletly, supra note 119, at 457. 
135 Lazzarini, supra note 65; UNAIDS. “Revised guidelines for HIV counseling, testing, and referral”. 
International Guidelines.  Online: http://data.unaids.org/publications/irc-pub02/jc520-humanrights_en.pdf. 
Year [UNAIDS] 
136 Somerville, supra note 129 at 1343.  
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with HIV/AIDS, the HIV-related criminal laws not only fail to complement public health 
prevention efforts, they appear to undermine them.  
3. HIV Transmissions Continue in Prison 
 
 Finally, one of the goals of imprisoning HIV-positive people having engaged in 
unprotected sex is to prevent them from reproducing their conduct. However, the result of 
criminally prosecuting HIV-positive people may do further harm.  
 
 One of the results of criminally prosecuting people living with HIV/AIDS is to 
increase the sero-positive populations in prisons and penitentiaries. Prisons constitute 
high-risk environments, particularly because of the high prevalence of intravenous drug-
use among inmates.  Studies conducted in Canadian penitentiaries have shown that the 
high prevalence of HIV infections are an important public health problem linked to 
injections.137 Injection drug use and the sharing of injection equipment has been closely 
linked to the high prevalence of HIV infections among inmates, many of whom report 
sharing injection equipment in prison. In fact, reports have shown that 30%-50% of 
Canadian inmates have a history of injection drug use,138 that there is a high prevalence 
of HIV infection among inmates, and that inmates transit yearly in and out of different 
prisons where the population turnover is high.139 Furthermore, care and counseling in 
prisons for people living with HIV/AIDS is scarce.140  
 
 Though it is difficult to establish a direct link between the criminalization of 
HIV/AIDS and the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in prisons, it is not a far-fetched 
assumption to infer that the criminalization of HIV results in imprisoning HIV-positive 
persons in an environment where drug use is highly prevalent, where risk behaviours are 
particularly high and where the turnover of infected inmates in and out of prisons is 
strong. Therefore, incarcerating HIV-positive people who has engaged in unprotected sex 
may not have the desired effect of blocking the transmission of HIV/AIDS, as the 
transmission of HIV/AIDS in prison is clearly higher than in society.141   
                                                 
137 See for example Céline Poulin et all. “Prevalence of Hiv and hepatitis C virus infections among inmates 
of Quebec provincial Prisons” (2007) 77 CMAJ. 3 [Poulin]; Richard Eliott. « Bloodborne infections in 
Inmates » (2007) 77 3 CMAJ 3, at p. 252 [Eliott]; Elizabeth Kantor. “HIV Transmission and Prevention in 
Prisons. Online: http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/InSite?page=kb-07-04-13#S4X.  
138 A. Durfour & al. “Prevalence and risk behaviours for HIV infection among inmates of a provincial 
prison in Quebec City” (1996) 10 AIDS, at p. 1007.  
139 Poulin, supra note 137,  at 253.  
140 Richard Elliott, supra note 137, at 262. 
141 Poulin, supra note 137, at 253.  
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Conclusion. 
This paper analyzes the role of deterrence in the criminalization of HIV/AIDS. 
Even though the deterrence rational is used in every HIV case, the fact is that deterrence, 
as a goal of sentencing, is only speculative. Non-legal literature, as well as expressed 
opinions by Canadian judges, are openly skeptical of the deterrence objective. This 
skepticism, as discussed in this paper, is based on the conclusions of a number of studies 
showing that potential offenders do not know the legal rules, do not make rational 
choices, or do not perceive the exact cost for a violation that outweighs the expected 
gain.142 According to the research conclusions outlined in this paper, the need to set 
sentences appears to be outweighed by significant potential negative impacts arising from 
the criminal procedures in Canada. 
 
In fact, as demonstrated that criminal laws in Canada are not likely to stop 
HIV/AIDS transmissions. Instead, they create a hostile environment enhancing stigmas of 
HIV/AIDS and thus prevent people from seeking testing and advice for fear of being 
identified as HIV-positive. Criminalization creates the belief that only HIV-positive 
people should carry the burden of protected sex. Finally, by imprisoning persons having 
engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse, criminal laws contribute to HIV/AIDS 
exposures and transmissions in prisons and the high prevalence of the disease among 
inmates as a result of their high use of intravenous drugs. It is then possible to ask 
ourselves: “if […] criminalization serves to undermine our overall public health response 
to the HIV epidemic, then we must seriously question whether the gains from 
criminalization are worth it”.143 
 
This paper strongly supports the idea that criminal law is not needed to reduce the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. The United Nations HIV/AIDS and Human Rights International 
Guidelines recommend that “criminal prohibitions on sexual acts between consenting 
adults in private setting be reviewed, with the aim to repeal criminal laws applicable to 
those activities and should not be allowed to impede the provision of HIV/AIDS 
prevention and care services”.144  Rather than criminalizing HIV, a combination of 
education, persuasion, social support, and increased informed media coverage represents 
the best hope for decreasing the incidence of risk taking in sexual conduct.  
 
                                                 
142 Robinson (2004), supra note 75, at 178. 
143 Dalton, supra note 88, at 255.  
144 UNAIDS, supra note 135, at paras 29(b) (c) (d). 
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